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RECENT DECISIONS
ments in which she referred to herself as Mrs. Akeson, even in the
instant application, and not as the wife of the decedent-employe. Fur-
thermore, testimony was given to the effect that Akeson had, at vari-
ous times, lived with claimant and decedent-employe at their home,
indicating full knowledge on the part of all parties that the relation-
ship in question was meretricious. This contradictory evidence was
further enhanced by testimony showing that the decedent-employe,
in his, application for employment and later for compensation, stated
that he was single, thus indicating that he never considered himself
married to claimant nor intended that they contract a common-law
marriage. Thus in determining the validity of common-law marriages,
the burden of proof rests upon the party asserting the marriage.' 9
The sufficiency of this proof, particularly when one of the parties is
dead, must be clear, convincing, and consistent, or it will fail,20 as
in the present case.
New York courts, in recognizing the validity of common-law
marriages contracted within this jurisdiction prior to April 29, 1933,
should, as in the instant case, continue to require a preponderance
of positive evidence showing a valid husband and wife relationship,
particularly Where there is any doubt as to the contractual intent of
the parties, or where there is suspicion of a contrary relationship.
This reasoning, as a matter of public policy, is necessary to prevent
the practice of fraud on the courts in the settling of estates, in claims
for compensation, and in other instances involving the matrimonial
relationship. That some hardship will result cannot be denied. How-
ever, the legislature, in abolishing common-law marriages, correctly
asserted the interest of the state in the marriage contract, in order to
protect that institution, the parties themselves, and the general
welfare of society.
PARTNERSHIPs-LiMITED PARTNERSHIP SEPARATE ENTITY FOR
PURPOSES OF PLEADING.-In an action by a limited partnership to
enforce a partnership claim, defendant counterclaimed a non-
partnership liability against members of the limited partnership as
individuals. The Court of Appeals decided that the counterclaim
was improper, holding that a limited partnership is a separate entity
for the purposes of pleading and that partners suing in a partnership
capacity are not proper adversary parties of counterclaims asserted
against them in their individual capacities. Ruizcka v. Rager, 305
N. Y. 191, 111 N. E. 2d 878 (1953).
10 Matter of Wells, 276 App. Div. 822, 93 N. Y. S. 2d 354 (4th Dep't
1949), aff'd mern., 301 N. Y. 796, 96 N. E. 2d 95 (1950).2 0 See Boyd v. Boyd, 252 N. Y. 422, 428, 169 N. E. 632, 634 (1930);
Matter of Wells, supra note 19 at 823, 93 N. Y. S. 2d at 356.
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In cases involving partnerships or partners, many counterclaims
or set-offs are generally held improper because of their non-
mutuality.' Thus, where a partnership sues on a partnership obliga-
tion, a counterclaim asserting non-partnership liability against one of
the partners is improper; 2 and conversely, in a suit against the part-
nership, an individual partner cannot counterclaim his private cause
of action against the plaintiff.8 Moreover, in non-partnership suits
involving a partner, the partner-defendant's counterclaim of a part-
nership obligation is not permitted, 4 and a defendant's counterclaim
of a partnership obligation against a plaintiff-partner is equally im-
proper.5 In these cases the counterclaims lack mutuality because they
involve setting off a joint obligation against a several obligation 6
and also involve the inequity of applying funds of the partnership to
satisfy personal demands against one of the partners.7 Finally, these
counterclaims fail to meet the test of whether the defendant could
institute an independent action on his counterclaim.8
Where, however, a statute attaches several liability to partnership
contracts, 9 or where the partnership is sued in tort,10 some courts
I See First Nat. Bank of Abbeville v. Capps, 208 Ala. 207, 94 So. 109,
110 (1922) ; Hughes v. Trahern, 64 Ill. 48, 53 (1872) ; Rush v. Thompson, 112
Ind. 158, 13 N. E. 665, 667 (1887).2 Yankelewitch v. Beach, 115 Cal. App. 629, 2 P. 2d 498 (1931); Ravold
v. Fred Beers, Inc., 151 Misc. 628, 270 N. Y. Supp. 894 (County Ct. 1933) ;
Roldan v. Power, 14 Misc. 480, 35 N. Y. Supp. 697 (Super. Ct. 1895) (alterna-
tive holding); see Peck v. Snow, 47 Minn. 398, 50 N. W. 470 (1891).
3 Omaha Crockery Co. v. Cleaver, 104 Kan. 642, 180 Pac. 273 (1919);
Hunter v. Booth, 84 App. Div. 585, 82 N. Y. Supp. 1000 (2d Dep't 1903);
Popham v. Rubin, 134 N. Y. Supp. 1067 (Sup. Ct. 1912); Peabody v. Bloomer,
3 Abb. Pr. 353 (N. Y. Super. Ct. 1856).
4 McGuire v. Lamb, 2 Idaho 378, 17 Pac. 749 (1888) ; Dehon v. Stetson,
50 Mass. (9 Metc.) 341 (1845) ; Heinrich v. Kirby, 64 Mont. 1, 208 Pac. 897
(1922); Rose v. Motes, 220 S. W. 2d 734 (Tex. Civ. App. 1949).
5 Metcalf v. People's Grocery Co., 24 Ga. App. 663, 101 S. E. 768 (1920);
Rush v. Thompson, supra note 1; Rath v. Kelly, 246 Mich. 25, 224 N. W. 377
(1929).
6 See Second Nat. Bank of Cincinnati v. Hemingray, 34 Ohio St. 381, 389
(1878); Spofford v. Rowan, 124 N. Y. 108, 113, 26 N. E. 350, 351 (1891);
Rosenzweig v. McCaffrey, 27 Misc. 808, 57 N. Y. Supp. 219 (City Ct.), aff'd,
28 Misc. 485, 59 N. Y. Supp. 863 (Sup. Ct. 1899).
tSee Omaha Crockery Co. v. Cleaver, supra note 3, 180 Pac. at 274;
Dehon v. Stetson, supra note 4, at 344; see CRANE, PARTNERSHIPS 333-334
(2d ed. 1952).
8 See Jones v. Blair, 57 Ala. 457, 458 (1876); McGuire v. Lamb, supra
note 4, 17 Pac. at 750; see PRASHKER, NEW YORK PRAcricE 267 (2d ed. 1951).
9 Merchants' Nat. Bank of Los Angeles v. Clark-Parker Co., 215 Cal.
296, 9 P. 2d 826 (1932); Owsley v. Bank of Cumberland, 23 Ky. L. Rep.
1726, 66 S. W. 33 (1902) ; see Note, 5 A. L. R. 1541, 1549-1551 (1920). For
a discussion of the joint and several liability of partnerships (N. Y. Part-
nership Law § 26), see PRASHKER, CASES AND MATERIALS ON THE LAW OF
PARTNERSHIP 140-141 (2d ed. 1946).




have ruled that an individual claim may be set off against a partner-
ship liability. In both instances the courts reason that the defendants
of the suit and counterclaim were both confronted with several lia-
bility, hence the requisite mutuality of claims.' Some counterclaim
statutes, reciting that judgment may be entered for defendants against
the plaintiffs or some of them,' 2 or in favor of defendants or some of
them,13 have been construed to permit the setting off of partnership
and non-partnership claims; this same result has been reached where
the counterclaim may seek relief different in kind from that sought
by the plaintiff.14 Further, in a personal suit against a partner at
law, where the other partners have agreed to allow the defendant-
partner to counterclaim a partnership debt,' 5 or in equity, where the
plaintiff is insolvent,' 6 a partnership counterclaim is proper.17
The instant case is important since the Court, without discussing
the aforementioned rules in determining the invalidity of the coun-
terclaim, extended the entity theory of partnership to the area of
pleading. Previous decisions in New York have gone only so far
as to regard partnerships as entities for purposes of construing agree-
ments and statutes.18 The Court reasoned that even if the non-
" Merchants' Nat. Bank of Los Angeles v. Clark-Parker Co., supra note
9, 9 P. 2d at 827.
12 Sloan & Co. v. McDowell, 71 N. C. 356 (1874).
13 Burton v. Blytheville Realty Co., 108 Ark. 411, 158 S. W. 131 (1913)
(plaintiff v. partnership; some partners counterclaim personal debt belonging
to old firm of which they were members). But see Select Theatres Corp. v.
Harms, Inc., 273 App. Div. 505, 506, 78 N. Y. S. 2d 159 (1st Dep't 1948)
(Section 266 of the New York Civil Practice Act ["A counterclaim may be
any cause of action in favor of the defendants or some of them against the
plaintiffs or some of them . . . ."] ". . . has not abolished the rule that
the debts asserted between plaintiff and defendant must be mutual, and, to
be mutual, the debts must be to and from the same persons in the same
capacity .... ).
24 Abraham v. Selig, 29 F. Supp. 52 (S. D. N. Y. 1939). In construing
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 13(c), the court also stated that a partner-
ship is not strictly a legal entity and that its decision would forestall a multi-
plicity of suits.
25 Hall v. Allen, 80 Mo. 286 (1883) ; Edelman v. ScholI, 65 Pa. Super. 357
(1916).
1 Hughes v. Trahern, 64 Ill. 48 (1872); Burns v. Lopez, 256 N. Y. 123,
175 N. E. 537 (1931); Second Nat. Bank of Cincinnati v. Hemingray, 34
Ohio St. 381 (1878).
'17 See PRASHKFER, CASES AND MATERIALS Ox NEV YORK PRACTIcE 536-
538 (4th ed. 1953) for other examples.
Is See Geitner v. U. S. Fidelity & Guaranty Co., 251 N. Y. 205, 167 N. E.
222 (1929) (entity for construing insurance agreement); Bank of Buffalo
v. Thompson, 121 N. Y. 280, 24 N. E. 473 (1890) (entity for construing mort-
gage agreement); Matter of Schwartzman, 262 App. Div. 635, 30 N. Y. S.
2d 882 (3d Dep't 1941), aff'd -inem., 288 N. Y. 568, 42 N. E. 2d 22 (1942)
(entity for construing state unemployment insurance law); see Hartigan v.
Casualty Co. of America, 227 N. Y. 175, 179, 124 N. E. 789, 790 (1919).
But see Williams v. Hartshorn, 296 N. Y. 49, 69 N. E. 2d 557 (1946).
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partnership counterclaim asserted a cause of action against the part-
ners individually, it did not include the party plaintiff, the limited
partnership, and hence such a counterclaim was invalid. 19 The in-
dividual partners were not deemed party plaintiffs upon the theory
that a partnership is a legal person, distinct from its members, rather
than an aggregation of joint obligors.20
Moreover, since the entity concept denies the identification of
the individual partners as the partnership, the Court, in holding that
a partner serves in two distinct capacities, individual and partnership,
extended to the law of partnerships the rule-already applied to
trustees,21 executors and administrators 22 by statute-that a person
suing in one capacity should not be subject to counterclaims in an-
other capacity. 23 The dual capacity concept as applied to partner-
ships, however, is not altogether new, since New York statutes dis-
tinguish between a partner's private creditors and partnership
creditors.24
A prime consideration in deciding these cases should be to pre-
vent appropriation of partnership assets to satisfy a private debt of
the partner. Since such an allocation could possibly jeopardize the
partnership's financial standing, it would be inequitable to other part-
ners, partnership creditors, and even employes of the partnership.
In fact, to allow such a non-partnership counterclaim would be con-
trary to the New York Partnership Law which provides that part-
nership property is not subject to attachment or execution for col-
lection of a partner's individual debts. 25  The instant decision, in
by-passing considerations of mutuality and of the joint or several
nature of partnership obligations, simplifies the rule on counterclaim.
The holding, if also applied to general partnerships, abolishes the set-
ting off of partnership against non-partnership claims, even if they
are mutual. Because the partnership is an entity distinct from its
members, non-partnership claims against its individual members are
improper, and likewise, partnership counterclaims by a partner
against the plaintiff belong to the entity, not the partner.
19 Hillary Holding Corp. v. Brooklyn Jockey Club, 273 App. Div. 538, 78
N. Y. S. 2d 151 (lst Dep't 1948); Kelvin Engineering Co. v. Knott, 212 App.
Div. 413, 208 N. Y. Supp. 729 (1st Dep't 1925); Williams v. Tompkins, Inc.,
208 App. Div. 574, 204 N. Y. Supp. 168 (lst Dep't 1924); N. Y. Cir. PRAc.
Act § 271.
20 For explanation of entity and aggregate theory, see Williston, The Uni-form Partnership Act, With Some Remarks on Other Uniform Commercial
Laws, 63 U. oF PA. L. REv. 196 207 (1915).2 1N. Y. Civ. PRAc. Act §2d7(3).
22 Id. § 269.
23 Select Theatres Corp. v. Harms, Inc., 273 App. Div. 505, 78 N. Y. S.
2d 159 (1st Dep't 1948); Binon v. Boel, 271 App. Div. 505, 66 N. Y. S. 2d
425 (1st Dep't 1946), aff'd tnem., 297 N. Y. 528, 74 N. E. 2d 466 (1947).
24 N. Y. PARTNERSHI1p LAw §§ 51(2) (c), 51(2) (e), 71(h).
25Id. § 51(2) (c).
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Moreover, as regards limited partnerships, since the limited
partners are akin to corporate stockholders and since limited partner-
ships are statutory creations, there is good reason to regard them as
legal entities.26 In any event, for those who fear the inroads of the
entity theory in the law of partnerships,2 7 the decision does not re-
lieve the partners from their full individual liability for partnership
debts.
X
STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS - CONTRACT PERIOD APPLIED TO
BREcH OF IMPLIED WARRANTY.-A cowboy suit, which decedent's
mother had bought from the defendant, caught fire and fatally burned
the child. In an action by the father, as administrator of his infant
son's estate, on the theory of breach of implied warranty of fitness
for use, the negligence statute of limitations was pleaded as a defense,
since more than three years had elapsed from the happening of the
accident. In affirming the lower court's denial of an order to dismiss
the complaint, the Court of Appeals held that the six-year contract
limitation period is applicable to actions for breach of implied war-
ranty. Blessington v. McCrory Stores Corp., 305 N. Y. 140, 111
N. E. 2d 421 (1953).
New York decisions have indicated that the form in which a
complaint is framed, whether ex contractu or ex delicto, is imma-
terial in determining the applicable statute of limitation. The de-
ciding factor is the true gravamen of the action.' In Schlick v. New
York Dugan Bros., Inc.,2 the three-year negligence period of limi-
tation was held applicable to breach of implied warranty actions. The
court clearly indicated the reasoning which motivated its decision
when it stated that "[a]n action to recover damages for personal
26 See Lanier v. Bowdoin, 282 N. Y. 32, 38, 24 N. E. 2d 732, 735 (1939) ;
Skolny v. Richter, 139 App. Div. 534, 537-538, 124 N. Y. Supp. 152, 154-155
(1st Dep't 1910) (shows how a special partner is related in a "detached and
impersonal" way to the partnership); see N. Y. PARTNERSH IP LAW §§ 91 (per-
mitting creation of limited partnership), 115 (limited partner not a proper
party to proceeding by or against a partnership) ; CRANE, PARTNERSHnIS 117-
120 (2d ed. 1952).
27 See Williston, The Uniform Partnership Act, With Some Remarks on
Other Uniform Commercial Laws, 63 U. OF PA. L. REv. 196, 208-209 (1915).
'Webber v. Herkimer & Mohawk St. R. R., 109 N. Y. 311, 16 N. E.
358 (1888) ; Loehr v. East Side Omnibus Corp., 259 App. Div. 200, 18 N. Y. S.
2d 529 (1st Dep't 1940), qff'd min., 287 N. Y. 670, 39 N. E. 2d 290 (1941) ;
Hermes v. Westchester Racing Ass'n, 213 App. Div. 147, 210 N. Y. Supp.
114 (1st Dep't 1925) ; Burrell v. Preston, 54 Hun 70, 7 N. Y. Supp. 177 (Sup.
Ct. 1889).
2 175 Misc. 182, 22 N. Y. S. 2d 238 (N. Y. City Ct. 1940).
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